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Implementing the Standby Letter of Credit Convention  
with the Law of Wyoming 
 
James J. White* 
 
 Since the sovereign states that make up the United Nations have not 
given that body the power to enact binding private law, some local 
mechanism must be employed in each state to transform any United 
Nations’ convention into the law of a sovereign state. That mechanism is 
usually the act of a federal executive and federal legislature.  
 
 For the first time in American practice, we propose to implement a 
convention by a federal adoption of law previously enacted by the states–
from Wyoming to New York–to implement the Convention on Independent 
Guarantees and Standby Letters of Credit (“Convention”).1 This state law is 
Article 5 of the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”). In the words of the 
proposed federal legislation: 
 
The purpose of this Act is to implement the Convention in the 
United States. This Act does that by giving effect to the choice of 
law provisions of the Convention and of Article 5 of the UCC.2 
 
 Under the rules set out in the proposed legislation, a letter of credit 
which is covered by the Convention but which has no choice of law 
provision will be governed, with two limited exceptions, by the law 
specified in section 5-116 (b) of the 2009 Official Text of Article 5. Section 
5-116 (b) in turn directs one to the location of the person against whom 
liability is asserted (e.g., an issuer who is claimed to have wrongfully 
dishonored). Where that party is located in a state of the United States, 
section 5-116 directs–and the federal legislation expressly affirms–the use 
of the 2009 Official Text of Article 5 as “the Convention” in the United 
States.   
 
* Robert A. Sullivan Professor Law, University of Michigan Law School. I thank Mark R. 
Christy, Michigan 2010 for his fine work.  
 
1 United Nations Convention on Independent Guarantees and Stand-by Letters of Credit 
art. 5, U.N. Doc. A/RES/50/48 (Dec. 11, 1995) [hereinafter The Convention]. 
 
2 Committee to Implement the United Nations Convention on Independent Guarantees and 
Standby Letters of Credit, Report on the Implementation of the United Nations Convention 
on Independent Guaranties and Standby Letters of Credit 11 (2010), http://www.law.upenn. 
edu/bll/archives/ulc/igasloc/2010june4_report.pdf. 
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 An UNCITRAL convention is a treaty for the purpose of American 
constitutional law and it must be adopted like any other treaty.3 The process 
to make an UNCITRAL convention into American law has several steps. 
First a representative of the executive branch signs the convention, and then 
Congress must somehow “implement” it.  Implementation can take several 
forms.  Some conventions are “self-executing.” Those require only the 
consent of the Senate by a two-thirds vote and become effective as domestic 
law without any other act of either house of congress. Conventions that are 
not self-executing require some more elaborate action from Congress. If a 
treaty is not self-executing then implementation legislation is required 
before it takes effect as domestic law.4 In this case, the implementation 
legislation calls for the adoption of state law as the United States’ 
implementation of the convention. 
 
 The only other significant private law convention that the United 
States has adopted, the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale 
of Goods (“CISG”), was ratified by the United States in 1986. Since that 
was a self-executing treaty, the text of the CISG became federal law by the 
Senate’s consent without Congressional enactment. Put differently, the 
CISG became effective as domestic law without any special implementation 
legislation, such as the legislation being proposed for the Convention. 
 
 In pages that follow I explain why the United States might chose to 
implement the Convention by use of state law, and I consider some of the 
interpretation issues that may arise from the American mode of 
implementation. 
 
Letters of Credit 
 
The Convention was adopted by the United Nations General 
Assembly in 1995 and signed by the United States in December of 1997.5 In 
 
3 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (describing the treaty-making process). 
 
4 The Supreme Court recently decided for the first time that a treaty-based claim was 
invalid on the grounds that the treaty in question was not self-executing. Medellin v. Texas, 
128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008). The Court stated that a treaty requires implementing legislation to 
become effective unless “the treaty itself conveys an intention that it be self-executing and 
is ratified on these terms.” Id. at 1356. The Medellin opinion is likely to deter sponsors 
from using self-execution to implement a treaty until its meaning is clarified by later cases. 
 
5 James E. Byrne, Report to the House of Delegates, 1998 A.B.A. SEC. BUS. L. REP. 286, 
available at http://www.law.upenn/bll/archives/ulc/igasloc/aba_res.pdf. 
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2008, an American committee (“Committee”) appointed by both the 
Uniform Law Commission and American Law Institute and working in 
conjunction with Mexican and Canadian authorities began considering the 
ratification of the Convention by the United States.6 At this writing the 
Committee has produced proposed American Understandings and American 
commentary to accompany the Convention. The Convention will shortly be 
put before Congress for its consideration.7 It will be accompanied with the 
Committee’s and the State Department’s proposal for American ratification. 
 
 As described earlier, the current plan for implementation of the 
Convention is to have Congress find that the various states' adoption of 
Article 5 of the Uniform Commercial Code is implementation. So instead of 
making the text of the Convention federal law either as a self-executing 
treaty or by enactment as part of the United States Code, as Congress might 
have done, Congress is adopting the Official Text of Article 5 as the 
Convention.8   
 
 To understand why Americans might regard the adoption of a state 
law as the appropriate method of implementing an UNCITRAL convention, 
one needs to understand something about the making of commercial law 
under American federalism. Until the early part of the 20th century it would 
have been common understanding among lawyers in the United States that 
both practice and the United States Constitution made commercial law a 
subject for state, not federal enactment. Of course, Congress always had the 
power to enact laws–such as those dealing with bankruptcy–where the 
 
6 Memorandum from James E. Byrne, Director, Institute of International Banking Law & 
Practice, to Edwin Smith, Chair, Drafting Committee for Implementation of the U.N. 
Convention on Independent Guarantees and Standby Letters of Credit (Oct. 22, 2007), 
available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/igasloc/jeb_memo.pdf. 
 
7 Memorandum from James J. White, Reporter, the Committee to Implement the UN 
Convention on Independent Guarantees and Stand-by Letters of Credit, to Uniform Law 
Commissioners (June 1, 2009), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ 
igasloc/2009june1_memo_pdf. 
 
8 Under the supremacy clause of the US Constitution “[t]reaties made, or which shall be 
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land … .” 
U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. A self executing treaty is equal in status to congressional 
legislation and will preempt contrary state law. The implementation legislation required for 
a non-self-executing treaty is also a piece of federal legislation. In both cases, when there is 
a conflict between a treaty and a legislative act “the one last in date will control the other.” 
Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888). Presumably Congress’ blessing of Article 
5 as the Convention will make it into federal law for that purpose as well, but that 
hypothesis has not been tested. 
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Constitution specifically granted the power to Congress.9 Since the 1930’s, 
the states’ grip on commercial law has gradually weakened. The decisions 
in the 1930’s and 1940’s greatly expanded the conception of interstate 
commerce and broadened Congress’ power to reach into apparently local 
affairs under the commerce clause of the Constitution.10  
 
 Despite the gradual encroachment on the states’ monopoly, the most 
extensive and carefully drafted commercial law still comes from the states. 
The UCC, enacted by all of the states, governs not only the sale of goods, 
but also personal property security interests and even letters of credit. That 
law is generally superior to the law that Congress produces not only 
because of the care devoted to it, but also because it is more stable.11 Much 
of the uncertainty in federal commercial law (such as the tax and 
bankruptcy codes) is introduced by the frequent Congressional amendments 
that those laws suffer at the hands of powerful special pleaders.12  
Presumably, because of the high cost of getting legislation through many 
state legislatures, state commercial law has escaped that kind of piecemeal 
change. 
 
9 U.S. CONST. art. 1, §1. 
 
10 See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel 
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
 
11 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 8.1A-103 (2003), and MICH. COMP. LAWS § 174-1962-1-2 
(1962). 
 
12 A nice illustration of the confusion and uncertainty that Congress can sow is the 
“hanging paragraph” that it inserted in Section 1325(a) of the Bankruptcy Code in 2005. 
The text of the paragraph is incomprehensible to someone who does not know its history.  
Hanging from 11 USCS § 1325(a), the paragraph reads: For purposes of paragraph (5), 
section 506 shall not apply to a claim described in that paragraph if the creditor has a 
purchase money security interest securing the debt that is the subject of the claim, the debt 
was incurred within the 910-day preceding the date of the filing of the petition, and the 
collateral for that debt consists of a motor vehicle (as defined in section 30102 of title 49) 
acquired for the personal use of the debtor, or if collateral for that debt consists of any other 
thing of value, if the debt was incurred during the 1-year period preceding that filing. One 
bankruptcy court complained of the “maddeningly inconsistent body of decisions.” In re 
Westfall, 376 B.R. 210, 213 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2007). Another has pointed out that one of 
the problems is that “Congress failed to define “purchase money security interest” in the 
hanging paragraph or elsewhere.” Reiber v. GMAC, LLC (In re Peaslee), 547 F.3d 177, 
184 (2d Cir. 2008). All of the many cases turn on the meaning of the purchase money 
phrase where a debtor has added the outstanding balance on a trade into the balance on his 
new car. The first court of appeals decision to address the meaning of this paragraph was In 
re Graupner, 537 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2008). The court discusses the wide divergence of 
opinions in the district courts and bankruptcy courts regarding the issue and agrees with 
other courts that have said that the text is poorly drafted.   
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 The states have fought federal intrusion, and Congress has shown 
neither the interest nor the patience necessary to produce first-rate 
commercial law.13 The American law that covers standby letters of credit, 
the topic of the Convention, is Article 5 of the UCC. Completely revised in 
1995, Article 5 is up-to-date and consistent with commercial practices both 
in the United States and abroad. In fact, revised Article 5 doubtless had an 
influence on the drafting of the Convention. 
 
 Even if Article 5 is up-to-date and conforming to commercial 
practice, the fact that the text of the Convention in the United States will be 
the UCC and not that of the Convention and that an American judge will 
usually interpret the Convention not by use of its language but by use of the 
words in Article 5, will present nettlesome issues.  In the pages that follow I 




 An American court applying the Convention will be directed to look 
at the text of the UCC,14 not at the text of the Convention. In the case of the 
CISG, Senate ratification of the CISG as a self-executing treaty made the 
text of that convention American federal law. Had it chosen to follow the 
route that is being proposed for the letter of credit convention, Article 2 of 
the Uniform Commercial Code, not the CISG itself, would be the text of 
that convention in the United States.  So under the CISG approach there is 




13 Both the United States Income Tax Code and the Bankruptcy Code are covered with 
ugly patches and stuffed with amendments that make them unintelligible to the average 
lawyer. For example, see Thomas E. Lauria & Kevin McGill, Strict Construction of the 
Bankruptcy Code: Is the Ability to Avoid Clean-up Obligations and Substantive 
Consolidation at Risk? (2006), available at http://www.whitecase.com/files/Publication/ 
04bead52-fe7e-4c01-8cde01e64b3886c6/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/8e626ef206d 
f-4af0-a9d710 e582f7370f/article_Strict_Construction_of_ the_Bankruptcy_Code.pdf. 
  
14 Memorandum from James J. White, Reporter, the Committee to Implement the UN 
Convention on Independent Guarantees and Stand-by Letters of Credit, to Uniform Law 
Commissioners (June 1, 2009), available at http://law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/igasloc/ 
2009june1_memo.pdf. Because the Convention is in direct conflict with Article 5 on setoff, 
and on the time of expiration of a letter that does not state a time of expiration, new federal 
or separate new state law will deal with those issues. 
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 When litigation over a standby letter of credit covered by the 
Convention occurs in a foreign state, the court there will look to the text of 
the Convention.  An American court dealing with the same issue will often 
use the text of Article 5 of the UCC.15 To the extent that ambiguities lie 
undiscovered in the words of the Convention or the words of Article 5, the 
American mode of implementation may produce conflicting interpretations 
of the correlative sections in the Convention and in Article 5 of the UCC.16 
 
 Consider the case of “document.” That word is defined both in 
Article 5 of the UCC and in Article 6 of the Convention. Article 6(g) 
defines the word as “a communication made in the form that provides a 
complete record thereof.” Under this definition a digital message can 
qualify as a document. By contrast Section 5-102(6) has an extensive 
definition of the same word that excludes digital documents unless the 
digital format is a “medium permitted by the letter of credit or … by the 
standard practice referred to in section 5-108(e) … .”  
 
 The United States commentary to Article 6 of the Convention 
asserts:  
 
That “document” is defined broadly enough to include digital 
documents does not by itself authorize one who is making 
presentation under the Convention to present documents in digital 
or other non-paper form. Thus where there is no authority in the 
undertaking or in the practice applicable to the undertaking to 
authorize the use of a digital document, the presentation of a 
digital document would render the presentation non-complying 
both under the Convention and under Article 5 of the UCC.”17  
 
15 Id. at 1-2. 
 
16 See id.  The direction in Article 13 of the Convention to determine rights and obligations 
in part by “the provisions of this Convention” will not direct a court to the text of the 
Convention because the text of Article 5 of the UCC will be “the Convention” in the 
United States. 
 
17 Commentary for the United Nations Convention on Independent Guarantees and  
Standby Letters of Credit 5 (March, 26 2008), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/ 
bll/archives/ulc/igasloc/2008march26%20ccd.pdf. The commentary includes a proposed 
“understanding” with respect to the definitions. Because the understanding does not apply 
to terms that are defined in the Convention it does not technically apply to the hypothetical. 
The understanding reads as follows, “terms used but not defined in the Convention, (a) 
have the same or substantially similar meanings to the terms defined in the official text of 
Article 5 of the UCC …, or (b) if there is no definition in UCC Article 5, have the 
meanings found elsewhere in the UCC, or (c) if there is no definition in the UCC, have 
meanings equivalent to the same or substantially similar terms used in Article 5 of the UCC 
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 To test the accuracy of the American commentary, consider a 
hypothetical case. Assume a standby letter of credit without a choice of law 
clause issued by an American Bank to a French beneficiary that calls for the 
presentation of a document without specifying the medium in which the 
document must be formed. Assume the beneficiary presents a document in 
digital format to the American issuer and the issuer declines to pay on the 
ground that the document was not in writing. If the beneficiary sues the 
issuer in the United States for its failure to pay, a court would look at 
Article 5 of the UCC and at the United States commentary and conclude 
that no “document” had been presented and thus no proper presentation was 
made. If, on the other hand, the case were brought in a foreign court, the 
court would presumably look to the text of the Convention and to any 
commentary or understanding in the foreign court's jurisdiction, but not at 
Article 5 of the UCC and not at the United States commentary. Unless its 
own commentary called for a different result, the foreign court would 
conclude that a “document” had been presented and that the presentation 
was proper. So the issuer would have liability for failing to pay if the case 
were tried abroad, but not if it were tried in the United States. 
 
 I am assuming that an American court would regard the United 
States commentary concerning the definitions at least as persuasive and 
possibly as conclusive. I am also assuming that the foreign court would look 
to the mode of implementation in its own country and would not feel bound 
to deviate from the text of the Convention simply because a semi-official 
committee in some other country stated its opinion to the contrary. 
 
 Whether the Committee’s commentary on the general consistency 
between the Convention and the UCC has been too sanguine remains to be 
seen. If I am correct about the two courts’ search for governing law, we 
have one example where the same case gets different results in an American 
court and a foreign court. I have identified only one potential point of 
conflict.  Driven by their clients’ interest, clever lawyers will surely find 
many more.  
 
Opting Into the Convention Text 
 
 Because the United States proposes to implement the Convention by 
use of the UCC and to direct its courts to apply the text of the UCC in lieu 
of the Convention’s text, foreign banks or lawyers acting on behalf of 
foreign beneficiaries or banks may wish to limit an American court to the 
                                                                                                                       
(e.g., “documentary” and “non-documentary” as used in the Convention or the UCC to 
describe a type of undertaking, condition or presentation). Id. at 12. 
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Convention’s text and to prevent it from using the text of the UCC.  Can 
that be done? 
 
 The Committee intended so. When this issue was raised, the 
Committee was unanimous that the law should be interpreted to grant the 
power to the parties to a letter of credit to force an American court to 
interpret the rights under the letter of credit by use of the text of the 
Convention and not the text of the UCC. Section 5(a) of the proposed 
federal act that will be put before Congress currently directs an American 
court to use the “text” of the Convention to any letter “that expressly states 
that it is governed by the Convention… .”18 
 
American Case Law 
 
 What does the direction to use Article 5 as the text portend for case 
law? In cases covered by the Convention, are American courts to rely on 
American cases interpreting Article 5? And what if an American case 
interpreting a provision of Article 5 disagrees with a case in a foreign 
jurisdiction interpreting the analogous point under the Convention? 
 
 Article 5 of the Convention directs that “regard be had to [the 
Convention’s] international character and to the need to promote uniformity 
in its application….” The most obvious reading of that exhortation is that an 
American court should regard foreign courts’ interpretation of the 
Convention to be persuasive if not binding.  
 
 But the American commentary supports the opposite inference: 
“Article 5 [of the Convention] does not mean that a court interpreting the 
Convention should ignore the local law that may implement the Convention 
but merely that the court should pay due attention to cases that interpret the 
Convention….”19 The reference to “local law” is broad enough to include 
not only Article 5 of the UCC but also cases decided under the UCC.  
 
 Assume a standby that calls for payment only on presentation of a 
certificate of default by Robert Stein, the mayor of Ypsilanti. Assume that 
 
18 Committee to Implement the United Nations Convention on Independent Guarantees and 
Standby Letters of Credit, Report on the Implementation of the United Nations Convention 
on Independent Guaranties and Standby Letters of Credit 8-9 (2010), available at 
http://www.law .upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/igasloc/2010june4_report.pdf. 
 
19 Letter of Submittal, The United Nations Convention on Independent Guarantees and 
Standby Letters of Credit with the United States Commentary (May 7, 2009), available at 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/igasloc/2009may7_letter.pdf 
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Stein does not run for reelection and that his successor mayor Luther Jones 
signs the certificate of default. Assume further that the Supreme Court of 
Illinois finds the presentation proper. Two years later the identical issue is 
presented to an Illinois court under an international standby letter of a 
French bank governed by the Convention and assume that there are French 
and English cases under the Convention that hold that such a presentation 
(i.e., a certificate by a successor and not by the person named in the letter) 
is not compliant with such a letter. Is the court to follow the unanimous 
reading of the Convention by foreign courts or must it follow Illinois case 
law? 
 
 Following the deviant Illinois case hardly “promotes uniformity” 
even if one might conclude that paying “due attention” to foreign cases does 
not require a court to treat them as binding precedent.20 In my view any 
court finding itself in that position should, at the least, look for ways to 
distinguish the local cases and follow the foreign interpretations. After all 
this is international trade law and a principal purpose of the law is to make 
the applicable rules the same in all countries that have implemented the 
Convention.  
 
Changes in Article 5 of the UCC 
 
 It is easy to adopt Article 5 of the UCC as the Convention, but what 
about non-uniform provisions? And what about amendments that are 
adopted in some or many states after the Convention has been 
implemented? The proposed federal legislation uses the 2009 official text; 
state deviations must be ignored by a court that is deciding a case under the 
Convention.  
 
 And if after 25 years the Uniform Law Commission undertakes a 
complete revision of Article 5 of the UCC, then what?  In that case the 
Commission and the ALI could and doubtless should return to Congress for 
a new federal statute to implement the Convention anew by reference to the 
newly revised Article 5.  But what if there is no new federal enactment after 
the adoption of a revision to Article 5 of the UCC. Since the current draft of 
the federal implementing statute makes the 2009 Article 5 the American 
version of the Convention, state adoption of a new Article 5 (or even the 
ULA and ALI adoption of a new official text) will bring the ironic 
 
 
20 See U.C.C. § 5-101 cmt. (1977). 
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consequence that a new Article 5 would be the current official or state law 
but the superseded 2009 version would be the Convention.   
 
 To continue to apply a repealed version of Article 5 of the UCC to 
international letters of credit because that former text constitutes “the 
Convention” in the United States seems absurd.  However, the hypothetical 
case demonstrates a significant potential difficulty that can arise from doing 
what we now propose.  Once the United States makes Article 5 the “text” of 
a convention, there is a new impediment to the improvement of Article 5 or 
of any other part of our commercial law that has been used as the mode of 
adoption of an UNCITRAL convention.21  And if Congress fails to adopt 
the Convention anew, there is the possibility that the Convention would 




 “Understandings” are the weakest of the unilateral qualifications 
that a state can make to the terms of a convention.22 At least in theory an 
understanding does not change the legal effect of a convention; it merely 
“clarifies” the meaning.23 Of course, any lawyer is instinctively skeptical of 
something that clarifies but does not change. American common lawyers 
are trained to believe that all formal interpretations of a text, whether by a 
court, an agency or the Pope, alter the meaning of the text and that is doubly 
true if the interpreting body is the highest court of the state interpreting state 
law or a legislature that has adopted the law.  
 
 The proposal that will be submitted to Congress states four 
American Understandings (Understanding(s)). They deal with Article 6 
(Definitions), Article 20 (Provisional Court Measures), Article 21 (Choice 
of Applicable Law), and Article 22 (Determination of Applicable Law).24 I 
 
21 All of the original Articles (1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9) of the UCC except for Article 2 have 
been extensively revised and some (3, 4, and 9) have been revised twice. 
 
22 Other unilateral acts of adopting states are “reservations” and “declarations.” A 
reservation is an outright statement of rejection of the terms of a convention. Article 27 of 
the Convention prohibits a state that adopts the Convention from stating any reservations. 
Declarations are sometimes used to select among alternatives that have been left by the 
drafters for a state’s own choice.  The Convention, supra note 1, art. 25.  
 
23 Id. arts. 25, 27.  
 
24 Commentary for the United Nations Convention on Independent Guarantees and  
Standby Letters of Credit 12-13 (March, 26 2008), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/ 
bll/archives/ulc/igasloc/2008march26%20ccd.pdf. 
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discuss some implications for interpretation of the Convention that arise 
from the first and the third.  
 
 The Understanding on Article 6 adopts the UCC definitions–in 
Article 5 and elsewhere–for any case where a term is not defined in the 
Convention but there is a definition of that term (e.g., good faith) or of a 
substantially similar term in the UCC.  
 
 In the year 2050, assume that a Chicago Bank examines a 
documentary presentation electronically and concludes that the presentation 
complies with the undertaking. Assume that the applicant objects to the 
bank’s payment on the ground that such a mode of examination does not 
conform to “reasonable care” that is required by Article 14 of the 
Convention. May the Bank defend by citing section 3-103(a)(9) of the 
UCC? That section finds that a bank that examines an instrument by 
electronic means (and presumably never casts human eyes on it) is acting 
with ordinary care.25 Of course, the applicant will argue that the Article 3 
definition of ordinary care does not apply to the examination of anything 
but checks, but if the judge rejects that argument under the UCC, can he 
then apply the UCC definition to Article 14? The Understanding seems to 
say so.  
 
 At minimum, the upshot of the Understanding on definitions will 
require foreign and American letter of credit lawyers to have some 
familiarity not only with section 5-102, but also with sections 1-201, 2-103, 
3-103, 4-104, and 9-102, the other UCC definitional sections. The 
Understanding, as currently written, does not apply to cases where there is a 
definition in the Convention, but if the Convention is Article 5 in the United 
States that will not matter for cases before American courts. An American 
court applying the Convention will already have Article 5 of the UCC 
before it.  
 
 When a letter of credit “issued from the United States” provides for 
the application of the law of a state of the United States, the Understanding 
concerning Article 21 states that the undertaking is governed by “the 
substantive law in the UCC.” As I suggest above, the Convention may be 
the substantive law in the UCC in any case, but in a foreign court that 
would otherwise use the Convention’s text, this Understanding would make 
clear that Article 5, not the Convention is the governing text.  
 
                                                                                                                       
 
25 Assuming, arguendo, that “ordinary care” has the same meaning as “reasonable care.” 
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 What language in an undertaking is sufficient to “provide for the 
application of the law of a state of the United States?” Does the choice of 
the “law of New York” suffice? Some courts have found that similar words 
choose the CISG (as federal law applicable in the state whose law is 
chosen), not Article 2 of the UCC as the drafter of the language likely 
intended.26 I suspect that the proposed Understanding would change that 
outcome for the Convention. That conclusion is supported by the current 
version of the federal implementing legislation that says in Section 5(c) any 
“undertaking that expressly states that it is governed by the law of a State 
shall be governed by the law of that State and not by the Convention.”27 
Cautious lawyers might wish to refer to the “New York UCC” or use 
similar language as suggested by the commentary to Article 21.28  If, as 
currently proposed, the Convention is implemented by Congress’ reference 
to the Official Text of Article 5 and if the courts take to that plan, the issue 




Even if the use of Article 5 to implement the Convention increases 
the likelihood of conflicts between the Convention’s text and the text of 
Article 5, that increase is trivial. Constructing the American Convention out 
 
26 See, e.g., BP Oil Int'l, Ltd. v. Empresa Estatal Petroleos de Ecuador, 332 F.3d 333, 337 
(5th Cir. 2003) (stating that “If the parties decide to exclude the Convention, it should be 
expressly excluded by language which states that it does not apply and also states what law 
shall govern the contract”); Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am. v. St.-Gobain Tech. Fabrics 
Can., Ltd., 474 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1082 (D. Minn. 2007) (stating that “absent an express 
statement that the CISG does not apply, merely referring to a particular state’s law does not 
opt out of the CISG”).  The courts reason here that the states are bound by the treaty under 
the supremacy clause, so merely stating that the “law of New York applies” is not enough.  
In other words, the CISG is domestic law and applies absent an express intent to opt out, so 
if the parties just name the law of the state as the choice of law then they are just 
confirming that the treaty applies. Cf. Am. Biophysics Corp. v. Dubois Marine Specialties, 
411 F. Supp. 2d 61, 63 (D.R.I. 2006) (stating that “subsection 11(h) of the Agreement 
provides that the Agreement ‘shall be construed and enforced in accordance with the laws 
of the state of Rhode Island.’ That provision is sufficient to exclude application of the 
CISG.”) 
 
27 Committee to Implement the United Nations Convention on Independent Guarantees and 
Standby Letters of Credit, Report on the Implementation of the United Nations Convention 
on Independent Guaranties and Standby Letters of Credit 12 (2010),                
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/igasloc/2010june4_report.pdf. 
 
28 E.g., “[T]his undertaking ... is governed by the New York UCC and as to matters outside 
the scope of ISP98 and the UCC, by New York State and United States federal laws.”  Or 
“this undertaking is governed by the New York UCC.” 
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of carefully drafted law with which American lawyers and judges are 
familiar–in style if not in substance–outweighs the risk of conflict. The 
clarity of the UCC, the presence of its comments, and guidance from cases 
under the Code, make it far more likely that an American lawyer or judge 
will find the correct answer in that regime than they would if the Senate 
were merely to adopt the Convention text as a self executing treaty. So 
despite the interpretive issues that I raise here, I think we are right to use 
Article 5 of the UCC as the implementing tool.  
